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The year 2003 marks several notable anniversaries. Of most immediate
significance, it is the bicentennial of Ohio statehood. But it is also the bicentennial of
Marbury v. Madison,2 the case that is commonly but inaccurately said to have
established the United States Supreme Court’s power of judicial review.3 Moreover,
it is the centennial of W.E.B. Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk, which emphasized
the centrality of race to American life.4 These three anniversaries come together in
an important way. Long before the United States adopted the Fourteenth Amendment
1

Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. Thanks to
Dean Steven Steinglass and Professor Kevin O’Neill for inviting me to take part in this
symposium, to participants in a faculty workshop at Case Law School for suggestions on an
earlier version of this paper, and to Yvonne Wai for helpful research assistance.
2

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). I have a particular interest in this subject. One of my
colleagues has accused me of spending ten weeks on this case in my Constitutional Law
course. See Erik M. Jensen, The Continuing Vitality of Tribal Sovereignty Under the
Constitution, 60 MONT. L. REV. 3, 11 n.39 (1999). This charge is wildly inaccurate,
simultaneously both a gross exaggeration and a serious understatement. I have never devoted
more than five hours to Marbury before moving on to the next case. At the same time, the
issues raised by Marbury pervade the course. In that sense, everything is about Marbury.
3
The Court’s power to invalidate acts of Congress as inconsistent with the Constitution
was widely assumed before Marbury. See, e.g., United States v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171,
172 (1796) (Chase, J.) (stating the question presented as “whether the law of Congress [at
issue] is unconstitutional and void”); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton). See also United
States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 52-53 (1852) (note appended by Taney, C.J.,
discussing the unreported 1794 case of United States v. Yale Todd, in which the Court held
that Congress could not impose nonjudicial duties on judges).
4

There are, of course, other significant anniversaries this year. Among them: the
bicentennial of the Louisiana Purchase, see generally JON KUKLA, A WILDERNESS SO
IMMENSE: THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (2003); the centennial of
the Wright brothers’ first flight, see PETER L. JAKAB, VISIONS OF A FLYING MACHINE: THE
WRIGHT BROTHERS AND THE PROCESS OF INVENTION (1990); and the sixty-fifth anniversary of
the NAACP’s first Supreme Court case challenging segregated education, see Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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with its guarantee of equal protection in 1868,5 the Ohio Constitution contained a
guarantee of equality that drew on the natural rights principles embodied in the
Declaration of Independence. The Buckeye State’s original constitution, adopted in
1802, declared that “all men are born equally free.”6 The current version of the Ohio
Bill of Rights, adopted in 1851, provides for the people’s “equal protection and
benefit.”7 During the Nineteenth Century, the Ohio Supreme Court dealt with many
cases involving racial issues. In the process, the court developed a jurisprudence that,
although jarring to modern sensibilities, was in some respects surprisingly
progressive for its time. The court consistently rejected the so-called one-drop rule
and afforded unusual protection to many persons of mixed race.8 Even when
upholding racist laws, the court’s reasoning was considerably less offensive than that
of the U.S. Supreme Court in cases raising similar issues. By the end of the century,
however, the Ohio Supreme Court had largely abandoned the quest for a distinctive
jurisprudence of equality, deferring instead to the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The rise and decline of Buckeye equality doctrine is not merely a matter of
historical interest. Understanding this story can also shed light on contemporary
constitutional jurisprudence. Until the past decade or so, the Ohio Supreme Court
hesitated to develop distinctive interpretations of the state’s Bill of Rights despite the

5
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
6

OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 1. The full provision read:
That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent
and unalienable rights; amongst which are the [sic] enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety; and every free republican government, being founded on their
sole authority, and organized for the great purpose of protecting their rights and
liberties, and securing their independence: to effect these ends they have at all times a
complete power to alter, reform or abolish their government, whenever they may deem
it necessary.
The Declaration of Independence identified “certain unalienable rights,” including “life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” and emphasized “the right of the people to alter or
abolish” the government in appropriate circumstances. See generally CARL BECKER, THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS (1922);
PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1997).
7

OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2. This provision also echoed themes in the Declaration of
Independence. It reads in full:
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform, or abolish the same,
whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or immunities shall
ever be granted, that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the general assembly.
8

This history is apparently unknown or has been forgotten. A recent study of the Shaker
Heights public schools reports a seemingly widespread belief that Ohio did follow the onedrop rule. See JOHN U. OGBU, BLACK AMERICAN STUDENTS IN AN AFFLUENT SUBURB 176
(2003). Of course, the court’s rejection of this rule did not prevent some whites from adhering
to it. Also, as we shall see, some lower courts and an occasional justice did endorse the rule,
but the Ohio Supreme Court as an institution never did so.
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emergence of what has been called the New Judicial Federalism.9 Even now, the
court’s approach has been halting and inconsistent at best.10 Accordingly, this paper
will suggest some parallels between the older racial equality cases and the recent
effort to define the extent to which individual rights receive independent protection
under the Ohio Constitution. Part I examines the Ohio Supreme Court’s cases
defining “white” in the contexts of legal disabilities and voting. Part II addresses the
problem of segregation, especially in public schools. Part III focuses on the court’s
retreat from independent interpretation of the state constitution’s equality guarantee
and its general hesitancy to develop a distinctive approach to the Ohio Bill of Rights
even in recent years.11
9

Chief Justice Abrahamson, the keynote speaker at this conference, has been a leading
figure in this movement. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson & Elizabeth A. Hartman, Building
a More Perfect Union: Wisconsin’s Contribution to Constitutional Jurisprudence, 1998 WIS.
L. REV. 677; Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence
of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1985); Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951 (1982).
10

See Richard A. Saphire, Ohio Constitutional Interpretation, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 437
(2003); Marianna Brown Bettman, Ohio Joins the New Judicial Federalism Movement: A
Little To-ing and a Little Fro-ing, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. _491 (2003).
11

Before the Civil War the Ohio Supreme Court also dealt with slavery in a number of
cases. Comprehensive attention to the court’s slavery jurisprudence is beyond the scope of
this article. Nevertheless, a few cases deserve brief mention here.
The Ohio Supreme Court took antislavery positions in Tom v. Daily, 4 Ohio 368 (1831),
which held that a black boy born in Kentucky and sent to Cincinnati was free because the man
who had purchased his slave mother had done so for the stated purpose of setting her free and
could not thereafter claim that she was still a slave; in Birney v. State, 8 Ohio 230 (1837),
which held that a defendant could not be convicted of harboring a fugitive slave without proof
of knowledge that the person harbored was in fact a slave; and in Anderson v. Poindexter, 6
Ohio St. 622 (1857), which rejected the concept of sojourning and held that a Kentucky slave
brought into Ohio by his owner had become free by virtue of the owner’s voluntary entry into
the Buckeye State. Birney was the last installment of a highly publicized controversy that
helped to establish Salmon P. Chase as a leading opponent of slavery. Chase unsuccessfully
represented the alleged fugitive slave Matilda, who lost at trial and was immediately hustled
out of the courtroom by slave hunters before an appeal could be filed, and successfully
appealed the conviction of abolitionist James G. Birney, who had been charged with harboring
her. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 16465, 172 (1975); 2 CHARLES B. GALBREATH, HISTORY OF OHIO 203-04 (1925). On the
importance of the Anderson decision, which was handed down barely two months after Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT
CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 444, 692 n.89 (1978).
The Ohio Supreme Court also issued some proslavery rulings. Among them were
Richardson v. Beebee, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 197 (1846), which followed Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), and invalidated an Ohio law forbidding the
removal of any “black or mulatto person” from the state without first proving to a judicial
officer that the removed person was in fact a fugitive slave; and Ex parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St.
77 (1859), which refused to issue writs of habeas corpus to Oberlin residents who had been
convicted in federal court of forcibly rescuing a fugitive slave. Richardson was issued by two
justices on circuit, not by the full court. Bushnell was a 3-2 ruling that provoked a 97-page
dissenting opinion by Justice Sutliff, who has been described as “a pronounced Abolitionist.”
1 A HISTORY OF THE COURTS AND LAWYERS OF OHIO 250 (Carrington T. Marshall ed., 1934).
For further discussion of Bushnell and its relationship to Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.)
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I. DEFINING “WHITE”
Race was a pervasive issue in the events leading to Ohio statehood. Two
questions predominated: whether Ohio would be a slave state and whether blacks
would enjoy civil rights. The 1802 constitutional convention, which adopted the
state’s first charter, had little difficulty in deciding that Ohio would forbid slavery,
although the delegates debated extensively before endorsing two additional clauses
that were designed to prohibit certain forms of indenture that might have been used
to circumvent the ban on slavery.12 The civil rights question proved to be much
more problematic. After extensive debate, the convention by a one-vote margin
adopted a voting rights provision that limited the franchise to white males while
rejecting, by a similar margin, a more extreme proposal that would have precluded
African Americans from holding office or testifying in court against a white person.13
The racial restriction on suffrage would be continued in the 1851 constitution and
remain on the books until 1923.14 Although the other restrictions were kept out of
506 (1859), which dealt with a similar controversy that arose in Wisconsin, see COVER, supra,
at 188-89, 253-54.
12

The antislavery provision read as follows:
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in this state, otherwise than for
the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; nor shall
any male person, arrived at the age of twenty-one years, or female person arrived at
the age of eighteen years, be held to serve any person as a servant, under the pretense
of indenture or otherwise, unless such person shall enter into such indenture while in a
state of perfect freedom, and on condition of a bona fide consideration received, or to
be received, for their service, except as before excepted. Nor shall any indenture of
any negro [sic] or mulatto, hereafter made and executed out of state, or if made in the
state, where the term of service exceeds one year, be of the least validity, except those
given in the case of apprenticeships.
OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 2. For further details about the adoption of this provision,
see Helen M. Thurston, The 1802 Constitutional Convention and the Status of the Negro, 81
OHIO HIST. 14, 15-21 (1972); Barbara A. Terzian, “Effusions of Folly and Fanaticism”: Race,
Gender, and Constitution-Making in Ohio, 1802-1923, at 59-70, 93-102 (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Ohio State University, 1999).
13

See Thurston, supra note 12, at 21-26; Terzian, supra note 12, at 102-12.

14
See OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1 (amended 1923). For discussion of the retention of the racial
restriction on voting, see Terzian, supra note 12, at 206-10. This restriction was rendered
inoperative by the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, which allowed African
Americans to vote in Ohio despite the whites-only provision in the state constitution. See
DAVID A. GERBER, BLACK OHIO AND THE COLOR LINE, 1860-1915, at 40 (1976). The 1912
constitutional convention, which was dominated by progressive forces, proposed an
amendment to delete the word “white” from the suffrage provision, but the voters rejected that
idea. See HOYT LANDON WARNER, PROGRESSIVISM IN OHIO, 1897-1917, at 325, 342 (1964);
Robert E. Cushman, Voting Organic Laws, 28 POL. SCI. Q. 207, 227-28 (1913); Lloyd Luther
Sponholtz, Progressivism in Microcosm: An Analysis of the Political Forces at Work in the
Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1912, at 244, 246 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pittsburgh, 1969). Several sources note without explanation that the racial
limitation was finally removed in 1923, but no good historical study of this belated
amendment seems to exist. See, e.g., 2 GALBREATH, supra note 11, at 115; GEORGE W.
KNEPPER, OHIO AND ITS PEOPLE 335 (2d ed. 1997). One scholar notes in passing that the
enfranchisement of women might have affected the decision. See Terzian, supra note 12, at
279.
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the constitution, the legislature soon passed laws imposing various legal disabilities
on blacks. Consequently, the Ohio Supreme Court had many occasions to address
racial issues. The court first had to determine who was white under racial legislation
that restricted persons of color from appearing as witnesses. The rules developed in
this area served as precedents for interpreting the whites-only rule for voting.
A. Statutory Disabilities and the Definition of “White”
Although the 1802 constitutional convention rejected proposals to impose
additional limitations on persons of color other than the ban on voting, the legislature
quickly enacted statutory disabilities. In early January 1804, the second session of
the General Assembly passed a law requiring all “black or mulatto” persons
intending to live in the state to produce a certificate of freedom.15 Three years later,
the legislature stiffened the rules. Now any “negro or mulatto” immigrant would
have to arrange for a $500 bond “with two or more freehold sureties” in order to
assure the immigrant’s “good behavior.”16 Perhaps these provisions reflected a
genuine economic concern that slave owners in the adjoining states of Virginia and
Kentucky might force their aging or infirm slaves to emigrate to Ohio.17 That is
certainly not the whole story. Another provision of the 1807 law makes clear that
racism was a substantial factor in the adoption of these measures. That provision
prohibited any “black or mulatto person” from “be[ing] sworn or giv[ing] evidence”
in any legal proceeding in which a white person was a party or in which the state was
prosecuting a white person.18
The Ohio Supreme Court never addressed the constitutionality of this law, but its
decisions make clear the judicial distaste for racial restrictions. The leading case on
the meaning of the racial restriction on testimony is Gray v. State,19 in which the
defendant was one-quarter black and three-quarters white. Polly Gray was charged
with robbery; she invoked the statutory bar when the prosecutor called a black man
as a witness against her. The trial judge, observing that Gray was “of a shade of
color between the mulatto and white,” concluded that she was not entitled to prevent
15

Act of Jan. 5, 1804, ch. IV, § 1, 2 Ohio Laws 63, 63. This measure also required blacks
and mulattoes to register with the county clerk, who would on payment of a fee of twelve and
a half cents issue a certificate of freedom. Failure to obtain a proper certificate, either from
the county clerk or a court of competent jurisdiction, would prevent blacks and mulattoes from
obtaining employment. Persons who employed blacks and mulattoes who lacked a certificate
were subject to fines. See id. §§ 2, 3, 5.
16

Act of Jan. 25, 1807, ch. VIII, § 1, 5 Ohio Laws 53, 53.

17

See Terzian, supra note 12, at 117. This concern was made explicit in an 1831 statute,
which emphasized that the measure would not “enable any black or mulatto person to gain a
legal settlement in this state.” An Act for the Relief of the Poor, § 2, 29 Ohio Laws 320, 321
(1831).
18

Act of Jan. 25, 1807, ch. VIII, § 4, 5 Ohio Laws 53, 54. The legislature enacted
additional restrictions over the next quarter-century. See GERBER, supra note 14, at 4; see
generally STEPHEN MIDDLETON, THE BLACK LAWS IN THE OLD NORTHWEST: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 13-18, 47-48 (1993). Most of these measures were repealed in 1849 after more than
a decade of political struggle. See generally Leonard Erickson, Politics and Repeal of Ohio’s
Black Laws, 1837-1849, 82 OHIO HIST. 154 (1973).
19

4 Ohio 353 (1831).
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the black witness from testifying.20 The supreme court reversed in a terse ruling.
The law was “one which a court is called upon to execute with reluctance,”21 and the
justices were “unwilling to extend the disabilities of the statute further than its letter
requires.”22 Accordingly, the statutory terms “white, black, and mulatto” should be
strictly construed: “Color alone is insufficient.”23 The proper test was one of blood:
“[A] man [sic], of a race nearer white than a mulatto, . . . should partake in the
privileges of whites.”24 In short, any person who was less than half black was legally
white, regardless of skin tone.
This definition of white is strikingly more inclusive than the approach taken in
other states, not only during the Nineteenth Century but also well into the Twentieth.
Typically, a fraction of African ancestry as small as one-eighth or one-sixteenth was
sufficient to render a person legally black elsewhere in the country.25 For at least
some purposes, several states followed the notorious one-drop rule, under which the
slightest amount of African ancestry disqualified an individual from having the legal
status of white.26 At the same time, there is a profound irony to the Gray decision.
By expansively defining “white,” the court protected a visibly mixed-race defendant
against the potentially damaging testimony of a full-blooded black witness.
Nevertheless, the approach in Gray reflected the Ohio Supreme Court’s
discomfort with the race-based witness-disqualification statute. The court reiterated
its distaste for the law fifteen years later, in the civil case of Jordan v. Smith,27 noting
both its unsavory implications for the interests of blacks and its potential for
promoting injustice by excluding potentially crucial evidence. The dispute involved
20

Id. at 353 (emphasis omitted).

21

Id. at 354.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id. (emphasis added).

25

See generally PAULI MURRAY, STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (1950); GILBERT
THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 14-17 (1910).
26

See MURRAY, supra note 25, at 22 (Alabama), 39-40 (Arkansas), 90 (Georgia), 173-74
(Louisiana), 356 (Oklahoma), 428 (Tennessee), 443-44 (Texas), 462 (Virginia). Virginia’s
laws defining race have an especially fascinating history, at one time embodying both the onedrop rule for defining African Americans and a Pocahontas exception for descendants of John
Rolfe and the Indian princess. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial
Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967,
1975-81 (1989); Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia’s Anti-Miscegenation Statute
in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1191-1204 (1966). The state’s law against
interracial marriage was invalidated in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The last
installment in the battle over Louisiana’s racial classification laws was fought within the past
two decades. See Doe v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health and Human Resources, Office of Vital
Statistics, 479 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 485 So. 2d 60 (La.), appeal
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 479 U.S. 1002 (1986); see generally
Raymond T. Diamond & Robert J. Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana’s Racial Classification
Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 LOY. L. REV. 255 (1983); Calvin Trillin, American
Chronicles: Black or White, NEW YORKER, Apr. 14, 1986, at 62.
27

14 Ohio 199 (1846).
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a white man’s attempt to collect a debt from a black woman. The defendant denied
having executed the note, whereupon the plaintiff sought to rebut that denial with the
deposition of another black woman who claimed to have signed the note as a
witness. He argued that the second woman would not be serving as a witness in the
case but merely verifying the allegations of the complaint.28 The court rejected this
argument, reasoning that the logic of the plaintiff’s position would “more completely
put the black man in the power of the white” by allowing whites to take advantage of
blacks with impunity unless there happened to be a white witness to the events.29 By
effectively preventing an African American from “swear[ing] to the truth of his plea,
. . . you call in the courts of justice in carrying out a system of oppression.”30
Therefore, the plaintiff had to prove the execution of the note. Although there was
no doubt that he had a good claim, he could prove his case only through the
testimony of the second woman and the statute prevented her from testifying.31
Because there was no evidence to support the complaint’s allegations, the case had to
be dismissed even though the effect of the statute was “to prevent justice.”32
The Jordan opinion suggests that the court might have been receptive to a more
direct attack on the statute, but the white plaintiff sought to evade rather than attack
its exclusion. On the other hand, when confronted with a constitutional challenge to
the law two years later, the court avoided the issue. Woodson v. State ex rel.
Borland33 was an action against the surety of an estate administrator who allegedly
had failed to collect debts that were owed to the estate. The defendant surety sought
to call the debtors, who were mulattoes, as witnesses, but the trial court refused to
allow them to testify.34 On appeal, the surety argued that the disqualification law did
not apply in this case because none of the parties was white but that, if the statute did
somehow apply, it was unconstitutional.35 Without reaching that question, the court
held that the action could not proceed because there had been no proper demand for
payment.36
In short, the Ohio Supreme Court took pains to construe the witnessdisqualification law as narrowly as possible. Of particular significance, the
expansive definition of white would have wider implications for interpreting the
race-based qualification for voting.
B. “White” Voting
The constitutional limitation of voting rights to white males generated a
substantial body of litigation. The Ohio Supreme Court consistently adhered to its
28

Id. at 200.

29

Id. at 202.

30

Id.

31

Id. at 204.

32

Id.

33

17 Ohio 161 (1848).

34

Id. at 163.

35

Id. at 166-67.

36

Id. at 169.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004

7

402

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:395

expansive definition of “white” despite several attempts by the legislature to impose
stricter tests for voter eligibility. In all of these cases, the court relied on its reasoning
in Gray.
Voting cases first reached the court in 1842. In Jeffries v. Ankeny,37 the court
held that a man who was one-quarter Indian and three-quarters white was a lawful
voter. Chief Justice Lane observed that “many persons of the precise breed of this
plaintiff,” including the current clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court, had “exercised
political privileges . . . and worthily discharged the duties of officers.”38 Although
Gray had involved the construction of a statute involving African Americans rather
than the interpretation of a constitutional provision and the present case involved
American Indians, the court found the reasoning of the earlier case persuasive. If a
person who was more white than black could be white, so could a person who was
more white than Indian in ancestry.39 In Thacker v. Hawk,40 a case decided the same
day, the court explicitly rejected the one-drop rule for voting. A man who was partly
black and partly white argued that he had been wrongly prevented from voting. He
invoked Gray, but the trial court instructed the jury to find against him “if the
plaintiff have any negro [sic] blood whatever.”41 Chief Justice Lane dispatched the
issue in a single sentence, saying only that the “charge was wrong, and judgment
must be reversed.”42
These rulings did not settle the issue for whites who agreed with the Thacker
dissenter that “[t]he word ‘white’ means pure white, unmixed.”43 Following the
adoption of the new state constitution in 1851 and shortly after the Dred Scott
decision,44 the Ohio legislature passed a bill excluding mixed-race men from
voting.45 Local officials relied on the new law to prevent a man who was one-eighth
black and seven-eighths white from voting. The Ohio Supreme Court found the
statute unconstitutional in Anderson v. Millikin.46 The unanimous opinion began by
citing Gray and the voting cases decided under the 1802 constitution, then noted that
the convention that wrote the 1851 constitution had to know of the authoritative

37

11 Ohio 372 (1842).

38

Id. at 375.

39

A dissenting opinion endorsed the one-drop rule, asserting that the racial restriction
“excludes Indians and part Indians, and all persons not of the pure blood of the white race.”
Id. at 375-76 (Read, J., dissenting).
40

11 Ohio 376 (1842).

41

Id. at 379.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 380 (Read, J., dissenting).

44

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

45

An Act to Prescribe the Duties of Judges of Elections in Certain Cases, and Preserve the
Purity of Elections, 56 Ohio Laws 120 (1859); see Kenneth J. Winkle, Ohio’s Informal
Polling Place, in THE PURSUIT OF PUBLIC POWER: POLITICAL CULTURE IN OHIO, 1787-1861, at
169, 181-82 (Jeffrey P. Brown & Andrew R.L. Cayton eds., 1994).
46

9 Ohio St. 568 (1859).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/6

8

2004]

AN OHIO DILEMMA

403

judicial construction of the whites-only voting provision.47 Moreover, there was
actual evidence that the convention delegates were aware of this construction.48
Accordingly, the meaning of “white” in the voting clause was the same under the
new constitution as it was under the old one: men who were more white than black
were legally white and therefore entitled to vote.49 Moreover, nothing in Dred Scott
required a contrary conclusion. Scott himself was said to be a pure-blooded African,
so the case did not address the legal status of mixed-race persons.50 It was clear,
however, that the framers of the Ohio Constitution intended “no reference to color”
in referring to “citizens of the United States” in the suffrage section.51 Finally,
although the legislature was entitled to disagree with the court’s interpretation of this
crucial word, a mere statute could not alter the meaning of a constitution. The
framers of the new constitution were entitled to overturn the court’s interpretation of
the prior document, but they had not done so.52
Anderson did not settle the voting question. That issue became caught up in the
Reconstruction politics of Ohio. In April 1868, the antiblack majority that gained
control of the legislature in the 1867 elections passed another law forbidding anyone
“having a distinct and visible admixture of African blood” from voting.53 In Monroe
v. Collins,54 the court unanimously struck down this new law, reasoning that it was
even more objectionable than the one invalidated in Anderson.55 The statute imposed
“unreasonable burdens of proof” on otherwise qualified voters and improper limits
on the “kind and amount of evidence” that they had to produce in order to exercise
the franchise.56 In particular, “admixture of black blood may be proven by
47

Id. at 569-70.

48

Id. at 571-72.

49

Id. at 572.

50

Id. at 572-73.

51

Id. at 577. Indeed, if only whites could be citizens of the United States, the addition of
the word “white” to the voting section would have been redundant. Id. at 578.
52

Id. at 578-79.

53

Act of Apr. 16, 1868, § 1, 65 Ohio Laws 97, 97. This measure also required election
judges to propound a lengthy set of intrusive questions to challenged voters, who were also
required to produce two credible witnesses to attest to their whiteness. On the background to
this measure, see FELICE A. BONADIO, NORTH OF RECONSTRUCTION: OHIO POLITICS, 18651870, at 104-05 (1970); see generally id. at 79-109. This was not the only mischief
perpetrated by the new legislature. It also purported to rescind the previous legislature’s
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and rejected the Fifteenth Amendment. See
GERBER, supra note 14, at 39. The legislature tried to resolve any lingering ambiguity about
Ohio’s position by belatedly ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment earlier this year. See
Stephen Ohlemacher, More Than 130 Years Later, Ohio OKs 14th Amendment: EqualProtection Issue Ratified After Long, Bitter Fight, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 13, 2003, at A1.
It didn’t take that long for the Buckeye State definitively to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment.
That happened in early 1870. See GERBER, supra note 14, at 40.
54

17 Ohio St. 665 (1868).

55

Id. at 685.

56

Id. at 686.
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reputation, appearance, or opinion, and by any number of witnesses that may ‘seem
proper’ to the challengers, who may ask ‘any other questions’ that may ‘seem to
them necessary,’ but white blood must be shown by direct and positive testimony,
and in many, if not most cases, such testimony as can not be supposed to be within
the power of the voter.”57 Because the statute would exclude many potential voters
who were less than half black, it conflicted with the state constitution as that charter
had been repeatedly and authoritatively construed.58
These decisions demonstrate the Ohio Supreme Court’s commitment to limiting
the impact of racial restrictions on suffrage. By consistently holding that any person
who could claim ancestry of more than half white was legally white, the court
provided what by Nineteenth Century standards was unusually strong protection for
persons of color. To be sure, the court did not challenge the racist premise
underlying the voting restriction. Nonetheless, its rulings afforded rights to some
visibly mixed-race individuals who were regarded as black. Similar issues arose in
the context of public education, and at least for a time the court took a similar
approach to some persons of color in that setting. The court would eventually reject
constitutional attacks on segregated schools, but its reasoning was less offensive than
it might have been.
II. SEGREGATED SCHOOLS
To understand the background to the school cases, it is important to understand
that African Americans were excluded from Ohio public schools for many years.
The very first common school law, enacted in 1829, forbade “black and mulatto
persons” from attending tax-supported schools.59 Not until 1848 did the legislature
specifically authorize schools for nonwhite children.60 That law was repealed and
replaced by a somewhat different measure the following year.61 Both statutes
prohibited the imposition of taxes on white property owners to support colored
schools, so as a practical matter few communities provided for the education of
children who were not legally white.62 For many years, therefore, school litigation
dealt with whether children who were not purely white could attend public schools.
This question first arose in the 1834 case of Williams v. Directors of School
District No. 6,63 a case decided by two justices on circuit rather than by the full Ohio
57

Id. at 687.

58

Id. at 688-89.

59

An Act to Provide for the Support and Better Regulation of Common Schools, § 1, 37
Ohio Laws 72, 73 (1829). African Americans were not obliged to pay taxes to support the
common schools. Id.
60

An Act to Provide for the Establishment of Common Schools for the Children of Black
and Mulatto Persons, 46 Ohio Laws 81 (1848) [hereinafter 1848 Act]. There is some
confusion about the children eligible to attend these schools. The statute’s title referred to
“black and mulatto persons,” but § 1 talked of “black or colored persons.” Id. at 81.
61
An Act to Authorize the Establishment of Separate Schools for the Education of Colored
Children, 47 Ohio Laws 17 (1849) [hereinafter 1849 Act]. This bill also repealed the 1804
and 1807 disability laws, as well as some other black laws. Id. § 6, 47 Ohio Laws at 18.
62

See 1848 Act § 9, 46 Ohio Laws at 83; 1849 Act § 3, 47 Ohio Laws at 17.

63

Wright 578 (Ohio 1834).
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Supreme Court. At issue was whether the five children whose father was one-quarter
black and whose mother was white could attend the public schools.64 Relying on
Gray, the court reasoned that the school law focused on “blood and not
complexion.”65 Any other interpretation “might operate to exclude many children not
intended to be excluded by the Legislature” and in any event would reward the
school district for its “shabby meanness” of requiring the father to pay taxes to
support schools from which his children were barred.66
The full court endorsed this definition of “white” in several cases over the next
decade and a half. The first of these cases was Chalmers v. Stewart,67 in which a
teacher was not paid after allowing black children to attend his classes. The court
began by noting that it had just decided, in the voting context, that anyone whose
ancestry was more than half white was deemed to be legally white.68 This
determination did not resolve the case, however, because the evidence showed that
some of the children Stewart had taught were not legally white, and the school law
forbade black pupils from attending public schools.69 If this could be established, the
teacher had violated his obligation “to keep a legal school” and therefore had no
right to be paid.70 At this point the opinion took on a jarring and offensive tone:
Justice Wood analogized the teacher’s acceptance of black students to “admit[ting]
the vicious and corrupt [and] fill[ing] his school with prostitutes or thieves, or those
openly profane or licentious.”71 Subsequent cases avoid such inflammatory
language, however.
The following year, in Lane v. Baker,72 the court held that Gray and Williams, as
well as the voting cases, required a local school district to admit racially mixed
children who were more than half white. The jury found that the plaintiff’s son “was
of negro [sic], Indian and white blood, but of more than half white blood,” which
was sufficient to establish the boy’s entitlement to attend the public school.73
Then in 1848, in Stewart v. Southard,74 the court returned to the issue addressed
in Chalmers and dispensed with the inflammatory rhetoric. This unanimous ruling
rejected a white parent’s suit against the local school board for unlawfully allowing
colored children to attend classes.75 The court first distinguished Lane, which
involved the unlawful rejection of a legally eligible “white” student of mixed race
64

Id. at 579.

65

Id. at 580.

66

Id.

67

11 Ohio 386 (1842).

68

Id. at 387 (citing Thacker v. Hawk, 11 Ohio 376 (1842)).

69

Id. at 387-88.

70

Id. at 387.

71

Id. at 388.

72

12 Ohio 237 (1843).

73

Id. at 242.

74

17 Ohio 402 (1848).

75

Id. at 402.
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rather than the unlawful admission of legally ineligible students; the former was a
complete denial of the right to an education, whereas the latter simply made school
attendance “less desirable” than it might otherwise have been.76 The court went on
to find two insurmountable obstacles to the parent’s lawsuit. First, allowing the case
to proceed would open the floodgates to claims by every parent in the district, an
eventuality for which there was “[n]o necessity.”77 Second, there was no evidence
about how the particular school was funded. It was conceivable that the black
parents had voluntarily put up the money for the school, in which case the law
allowed their children to attend classes. Accordingly, there was a fatal flaw in the
record.78
These rulings, like those in the voting cases, offered legal protection only to those
mixed-race persons whose ancestry was more than half white. On the other hand,
the decisions provided limited benefits to some individuals who were commonly
regarded as persons of color. At a time when most African American children were
barred from public schools, those limited benefits suggest the Ohio Supreme Court’s
continuing ambivalence about racial discrimination. It would be wrong to regard the
court as a hotbed of abolitionist sentiment, of course, but that tribunal was surely
more progressive than the U.S. Supreme Court during this period.
The education cases discussed so far addressed only who was eligible to attend
public schools. Now we turn to cases involving segregation. Those cases suggest
that the Ohio Supreme Court was more tolerant of race-based laws when those laws
at least in theory provided alternative options for African Americans than when those
laws completely denied them rights or opportunities that were available to whites.
The court first upheld segregated schools in State ex rel. Directors of the Eastern
and Western School Districts v. City of Cincinnati,79 a case that arose under the 1849
separate school law. Under that statute, two separate colored school districts were
established in Cincinnati, and city officials collected taxes from African American
residents to support those districts. Those officials refused, however, to disburse the
funds to the school districts, at least in part on the theory that the 1849 law was
unconstitutional because it allowed African Americans to serve as school district
directors.80 The court rejected this argument. It began by noting that the 1849
school law had also repealed most of the statutory disabilities that previously had
been imposed on black Ohioans, which would presumably have allowed the
admission of African American children to the previously all-white Cincinnati public
schools unless the city acted under other sections of this statute to create separate
schools for colored youth.81 Nothing in the Ohio Constitution prevented the
legislature from authorizing the creation of such districts.82 Finally, the court
explained that invalidating the separate colored school districts would have the
76

Id. at 404-05.

77

Id. at 406.

78

Id.

79

19 Ohio 178 (1850).

80

Id. at 196.

81

Id. at 191.

82

Id. at 197.
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undesirable consequence of allowing African American children to attend the white
schools. “As a matter of policy,” said the court, “it is unquestionably better that the
white and colored youth should be placed in separate schools.”83
We can read this ruling in at least two ways. First, and most obviously, it upheld
segregated schools. That fact is not especially unusual. Indeed, the year before this
case was decided, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld segregated
schools in Roberts v. City of Boston.84 Second, and more significant, unlike Roberts,
in which segregation was challenged by African Americans who sought integrated
public schools, the challengers in the Cincinnati case were local officials who had no
interest in providing any education at all for black children. Despite the Ohio
Supreme Court’s obvious distaste for integration, its unanimous decision makes clear
that the city could not prevent African Americans from attending school. The
validity of segregation was not really at issue in this case.
That subject was strongly affected by the new school law of 1853, which
repealed the 1849 statute and comprehensively restructured public education in
Ohio.85 This new measure specifically authorized public schools for “colored
children” but did not define that crucial term.86 In Van Camp v. Board of
Education,87 the Ohio Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, for the first time departed
from the rule that any person who is more than half white by blood is legally white.
Local school officials in the Village of Logan, in Hocking County, refused to permit
children who were five-eighths white and three-eighths black to attend the white
public school.88 The majority opinion emphasized that the 1853 school law required
school districts to create separate schools for African Americans and guaranteed
those schools a proportionate share of all school taxes collected.89 Accordingly, the
statute was “one of classification and not of exclusion,” so the traditional racial
definitions did not necessarily apply.90 Whites over the previous two generations had
developed a “natural repugnance” against close association with African Americans,
whom the majority described in terms reminiscent of Dred Scott as “a proscribed and
degraded race.”91 Moreover, it was “notorious” that the court’s rulings allowing
83

Id. at 198.

84

59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849). The U.S. Supreme Court would attach considerable
significance to this ruling from the highest court in a jurisdiction where the interests of African
Americans “ha[d] been longest and most earnestly enforced.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 544 (1896).
85

An Act to Provide for the Reorganization, Supervision and Maintenance of Common
Schools, 51 Ohio Laws 429 (1853) [hereinafter 1853 Act].
86

Id. § 31, 51 Ohio Laws at 441.

87

9 Ohio St. 406 (1859).

88

Id. at 408.

89

Id. at 409. The majority might have given this provision an excessively positive
interpretation. The obligation to provide separate schools for colored children arose only
when there were more than 30 such children in the district. See 1853 Act § 31, 51 Ohio Laws
at 441.
90

Van Camp, 9 Ohio St. at 410.

91

Id.
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visibly colored children to attend classes with white children “did not receive the
hearty approval of the state at large.”92 Under these circumstances, the legislature’s
references to race in the school law should be given their “ordinary and common
acceptation.”93 The children at issue were “in fact, if not in law, colored.”94 Except
for Gray, most of the earlier cases are only cursorily reasoned, and the decisions
appeared to rest on the exclusionary nature of the restrictions; under the 1853 school
law, by contrast, black and visibly mixed-race children were provided for.95 Only at
this point did the majority concede that there was no colored school in Logan
because of the small number of African American children (fewer than the statutory
threshold of thirty). Still, making “further and more definite provision” for the
plaintiff’s children was “a matter for the consideration of the legislature, and not for
the judiciary.”96 As a result, the children could not attend any public school at all.
For them, the practical effect of this ruling was indeed exclusion rather than
classification.
The dissenters challenged every aspect of the court’s analysis. They viewed the
majority as having endorsed “caste legislation”97 and, in language that anticipated
modern equal protection doctrine, warned against racial, religious, and similar
classifications, which deserved “strict construction” against their validity.98 They
concluded with an extensive review of prior cases, which established that the terms
“white” and “colored” had precise legal definitions that differed from popular
usage.99 Ironically, the full court used precisely this kind of analysis later the same
term in Anderson, the unanimous decision striking down the legislature’s attempt to
eliminate mixed-race voting.100
Meanwhile, Van Camp contributed to the
legislature’s revision of the 1853 law in 1864. That amendment lowered the
threshold for establishing colored schools to twenty and authorized adjoining school
districts with lower school-age African American populations to combine their
resources to provide separate education for minority pupils.101 This development led
92

Id. at 411 (noting “the repugnance felt by many of the white youths and their parents to
mingling, socially and on equal terms, with those who had any perceptible admixture of
African blood”). The majority’s reasoning therefore cannot be construed as even implicitly
endorsing the one-drop rule. The court explained that “[t]he only question presented” in the
case dealt with the legal status of “children of five-eighths white and three-eights African
blood, who are distinctly colored and generally treated and regarded as colored children by
the community where they reside.” Id. at 408 (emphasis added). Under the school law, the
majority concluded that “colored” meant “[a] person who has any perceptible admixture of
African blood.” Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
93

Id. at 412.

94

Id. at 411.

95

Id. at 413.

96

Id. at 414.

97

Id. at 415 (Sutliff, J., dissenting).

98

Id. at 416.

99

Id.; see id. at 416-24 (reviewing decisions dating back to Gray).

100

See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.

101

Act of Mar. 18, 1864, § 4, 61 Ohio Laws 31, 33.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/6

14

2004]

AN OHIO DILEMMA

409

to another important segregation ruling that the U.S. Supreme Court would cite in
two of its most important cases on the subject.
The direct legal challenge to segregated schools in Ohio came in the case of State
ex rel. Garnes v. McCann.102 The case was tried on stipulated facts. The only
question was the constitutionality of separate schools; the parties agreed that the
school for colored children “affords to such children all the advantages and
privileges of a common school, equal to those of the school for white children.”103 A
unanimous court rejected the constitutional challenge. The opinion emphasized that
the black children had not been denied an education equal to that afforded to whites;
if that had been the situation, “more doubt would arise.”104 Prior cases had “firmly
established” the government’s power under state law to classify and segregate
schoolchildren.105 Turning to federal law, the court rejected arguments based on the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although that
provision had yet to receive authoritative construction from the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Ohio Supreme Court anticipated the ruling in The Slaughter-House Cases106 that
this provision offered limited protection against state regulations. The court
suggested that the clause “includes only such privileges or immunities as are derived
from, or recognized by, the constitution of the United States.”107 Moreover, there
was no equal protection violation because the segregation law did not “deprive
colored persons of any rights”; that law guaranteed “equal common school
advantages.”108 Echoing the reasoning of Van Camp, although perhaps with greater
justification because there were in fact separate public schools for colored pupils in
this case, the court found that the black children had been classified rather than
excluded:
Equality of rights does not involve the necessity of educating white and
colored persons in the same school, any more than it does that of
educating children of both sexes in the same school, or that different
grades of scholars must be kept in the same school. Any classification
which preserves substantially equal school advantages is not prohibited by
either the State or federal constitution, nor would it contravene the
provisions of either.109
The U.S. Supreme Court would cite Garnes in two of its major segregation cases,
but the Court seems not to have read the opinion very carefully. The first citation
102

21 Ohio St. 198 (1872).

103

Id. at 203.

104

Id. at 207. Because of the absence of any provision for the education of colored
children in Van Camp, the Garnes court explicitly declined to “approve or disapprove” the
result in that earlier case, although it did endorse the basic principle that the separate-school
law was one of classification only. Id. at 208.
105

Id. at 208.

106

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).

107

Garnes, 21 Ohio St. at 210.

108

Id.

109

Id. at 211.
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came in Plessy v. Ferguson,110 as the first case in a list of state cases that upheld
segregated schools.111 The second was second in another string citation in Gong Lum
v. Rice,112 a case that suggested that the validity of segregated schools had long ago
been settled.113 Plessy in particular might have been marginally less offensive had
the majority relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s approach in Garnes, with its
emphasis on classification rather than exclusion. Instead, the majority drew a forced
distinction between political and social equality,114 then dismissed the idea that
segregation stigmatized African Americans as a figment of hypersensitive black
imaginations.115 Despite the result upholding segregation, Garnes at least did not
add gratuitous insult to the injury of its actual holding.
There is one last footnote to Ohio’s school segregation saga during the
Nineteenth Century. As in Roberts, which was effectively overruled by the
Massachusetts legislature,116 the Ohio General Assembly repealed the statutory
authorization for segregated schools in 1887.117 The repeal came about due to
intense competition between Republicans and Democrats for the African American
vote.118 The Ohio Supreme Court recognized the statutory repeal the following year
in a one-paragraph opinion that made clear that boards of education could not take
account of race or color in assigning children to public schools.119
III. THE END OF OHIO EQUALITY DOCTRINE AND THE MEANING OF THE
STATE BILL OF RIGHTS
The Ohio Supreme Court’s Nineteenth Century jurisprudence of racial equality
reflected the country’s and the state’s profound ambivalence about this subject. The
110

163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896).

111

This string citation followed the Court’s discussion of the Roberts case involving
segregation in Boston. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
112

275 U.S. 78, 86 (1927).

113

Id. at 85-86. See also Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 504 (1878) (Clifford, J., concurring
in the judgment) (citing Garnes for the proposition that segregation is constitutional when
there is “no substantial inequality” between separate accommodations).
114

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545.

115

Id. at 551 (“We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but only
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”).
116

See Ch. 256, 1855 Mass. Acts 674.

117

See An Act to Repeal Sections 4008, 6987 and 6988 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, 84
Ohio Laws 34 (1887).
118

See GERBER, supra note 14, at 237-43.

119

See Bd. of Educ. v. State ex rel. Gibson, 45 Ohio St. 555, 16 N.E. 373 (1888) (per
curiam). The repeal of the segregation laws did not eliminate segregated schools in Ohio.
See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 500 F. Supp. 404, 407-10 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff’d, 662 F.2d 1219
(6th Cir. 1981); Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 234-36 (S.D. Ohio
1977), aff’d in part and remanded on other grounds, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 443
U.S. 449 (1979).
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court never invalidated a racial classification during this period. In part, this
reflected the arguments of litigants, few of whom ever contested the constitutionality
of laws and public policies that discriminated on the basis of race. The paucity of
constitutional arguments might have reflected gaps in existing legal doctrine. After
all, the racial restriction on voting was written into the state constitution, and the
federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the states at this time.120 When constitutional
arguments were presented, the court either avoided or rejected them. Even in
rejecting such arguments in Garnes, the court at least treated them with a modicum
of respect. Of course, that ruling ignored the real meaning of segregation, which the
first Justice Harlan recognized in his celebrated Plessy dissent: “Every one knows
that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white
persons from [facilities] occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from
[facilities] occupied by or assigned to white persons.”121 Still, the Ohio Supreme
Court apparently went out of its way to construe racial restrictions narrowly and
repeatedly emphasized their evil effects. In this respect, at least, the court was
notably more sensitive than the U.S. Supreme Court and most other state courts.
Unfortunately, the last school case was decided just a few years before the court
effectively abandoned the idea of developing a coherent body of Ohio-based equality
doctrine. By 1895, the state supreme court was saying that the guarantees of the
Ohio equal protection clause were coextensive with those of the federal equal
protection clause.122 For more than a century now, the state constitution’s equality
guarantee has had no independent significance.123 The only rationalization for this
phenomenon was offered more than eighty years ago: the U.S. Supreme Court’s
greater expertise arising from its dealing with more equal protection cases than “any
state court.”124 One possible consequence of the retreat from Buckeye equality
doctrine was a 1933 ruling upholding segregation in higher education. In State ex
rel. Weaver v. Board of Trustees,125 the court found no equal protection problem in
120

See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).

121

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Of course,
Justice Harlan had his own blind spots about race. See id. at 561 (discussing the Chinese, “a
race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens
of the United States”); see generally Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the
Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151, 157-66 (1996).
122

See State ex rel. Schwartz v. Ferris, 53 Ohio St. 314, 341, 41 N.E. 579, 584 (1895).

123

See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 95 Ohio St. 3d 264, 266, 767 N.E.2d 251, 255 (2002);
Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dep’t, 70 Ohio St. 3d 351, 353, 639 N.E.2d 31, 33 (1994);
Beatty v. Akron City Hospital, 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 491, 424 N.E.2d 586, 591-92 (1981);
Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 41 Ohio St. 2d 120, 123, 322 N.E.2d 880, 882
(1975); State ex rel. Struble v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 555, 560, 9 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1937); City
of Xenia v. Schmidt, 101 Ohio St. 437, 449, 130 N.E. 24, 27 (1920); Steele, Hopkins &
Meredith Co. v. Miller, 92 Ohio St. 115, 126, 110 N.E. 648, 651 (1915).
124
City of Xenia v. Schmidt, 101 Ohio St. 437, 449, 130 N.E. 24, 27 (1920). This notion
overlooks the possibility that the Ohio equality provision, like other state constitutional
equality guarantees, was “drafted differently, adopted at different times, and aimed at different
evils” than the federal provision. Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1197 (1985).
125

126 Ohio St. 290, 185 N.E. 196 (1933) (per curiam).
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Ohio State University’s exclusion of an African American home economics major
from living in a laboratory house with several other students, which was a degree
requirement in her field. The university offered her an alternative arrangement that
would keep her from sharing quarters with white students.126 A per curiam opinion
quickly dispatched her constitutional challenge. To be sure, the opinion invoked
Garnes for the proposition that she would have “substantially equal school
advantages” under the alternative, segregated arrangement.127 The bulk of the
analysis relied primarily on Plessy, however, as the justices went on to characterize
the young woman’s claim as involving social rather than political equality and
concluded that she had no legitimate grievance against the university.128 Although
this ruling came only six years after the U.S. Supreme Court had suggested that the
constitutional validity of educational segregation was settled,129 another state court
would shortly find that some types of school segregation could still be
impermissible.130 Moreover, the idea of segregating African American students
within an otherwise racially mixed university seemed especially incongruous.131
Whether or not greater reliance on Ohio constitutional doctrine would have changed
the outcome of Weaver, the increased sensitivity to racial issues exhibited in so many
of the Nineteenth Century opinions might have affected the tone of the ruling.
Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court’s subordination of state to federal equality
principles was part of a much more general reluctance to develop a body of doctrine
interpreting other provisions of the state’s Bill of Rights. This reluctance could not
initially have reflected deference to the U.S. Supreme Court’s greater experience in
dealing with individual rights claims asserted against state and local governments,
because until 1925 no provision of the federal Bill of Rights had been incorporated
against the states.132 In fact, the call for state supreme courts to develop an
independent jurisprudence affording greater protection to individual liberties than
was available under the U.S. Constitution dates back just over a quarter-century and
arose in response to concerns about restrictive interpretations of the federal Bill of
Rights.133 The Buckeye State was hardly a pioneer in this respect: the Ohio Supreme
126

Id. at 290-94, 185 N.E. at 196-97.

127

Id. at 297, 185 N.E. at 199.

128

Id. at 297-99, 185 N.E. at 199. This case became an issue in the 1936 gubernatorial
election, when Democratic Governor Martin L. Davey attacked his Republican opponent,
Attorney General John W. Bricker, for having defended the university in Weaver. See Frank P.
Vazzano, Martin Davey, John Bricker, and the Ohio Election of 1936, 104 OHIO HIST. 5, 18
(1995).
129

See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.

130

See Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936).

131

See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950).

132

See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and
do assume that freedom of speech and of the press–which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress–are among the fundamental personal rights and
‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment
by the States.”).
133
See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); see also James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
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Court waited until 1993 to declare that “the Ohio Constitution is a document of
independent force.”134 Indeed, the court’s hesitancy in this regard has been described
as a judicial “failure.”135 Regardless of the accuracy of this description, the record is
decidedly mixed. Others in this symposium will address this topic in more detail.136
For now, let me offer only two examples.
Consider first the judicial minuet in the Robinette case, which involved the
constitutionality of a motor vehicle search after a traffic stop. The Ohio Supreme
Court first held the search unlawful under the Fourth Amendment and the Ohio
Constitution.137 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Amendment holding
and remanded the case for further proceedings.138 Despite a virtual invitation from
Justice Ginsburg in a concurring opinion to ground its decision exclusively on state
law,139 the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the protections afforded by the state
constitution were “coextensive” with those provided by the Fourth Amendment.140
Finally, consider State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State,141 a 4-3 regulatory-taking case
decided late last year. The Division of Reclamation of the Ohio Department of
Natural Resources designated 833 acres of land as unsuitable for coal mining
because mining operations could harm an aquifer that supplied water to a nearby
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 762-63 nn.5-7 (1992) (collecting additional sources
advocating the same approach).
134

Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 67 Ohio St. 3d 35, 42, 616 N.E.2d 163, 169 (1993).

135

See Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism and the Ohio
Supreme Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 143 (1984).
136

See Bettman, supra note 10; Saphire, supra note 10.

137

State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 653 N.E.2d 695 (1995).

138

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).

139

See id. at 44-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (“On remand, the Ohio
Supreme Court may choose to clarify that its instructions to law enforcement officers in Ohio
find adequate and independent support in state law, and that in issuing these instructions, the
court endeavored to state dispositively only the law applicable in Ohio.”).
140

State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St. 3d 234, 238, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766 (1997). The majority
opinion emphasized that Article I, § 14 of the Ohio Constitution was “in almost the exact
language” of the Fourth Amendment, id. at 239, 685 N.E.2d at 767, and that there was “no
persuasive reason” to interpret the provisions differently. Id. at 238, 685 N.E.2d at 766.
Applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court for
Fourth Amendment purposes rather than the bright-line rule it had used in its previous
decision, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed that the search was unlawful. Id. at 246, 685
N.E.2d at 771-72. Because this ruling rested explicitly on the Ohio Constitution (albeit
applying the same standard that applied under the Fourth Amendment), there were no grounds
for seeking further review in the U.S. Supreme Court. For discussion of the substantive
implications of this final ruling in Robinette, see Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from
the Lexicon of Traffic Stop Interrogations, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 27 (1998). For discussion of
the judicial-federalism aspects of the case, see Marianna Brown Bettman, Identical
Constitutional Language: What Is a State Court to Do? The Ohio Case of State v. Robinette,
32 AKRON L. REV. 657 (1999); Ben Glassman, Decide the Law Clearly–A Reply to Judge
Bettman, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 469 (2000).
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98 Ohio St. 3d 1, 780 N.E.2d 998 (2002).
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village.142 After concluding that the mining company had no federal takings claim,143
the court declared that “states are free to interpret their constitutions independently
of the United States Constitution as long as that interpretation affords, at a minimum,
the same protection as its federal counterpart.”144 Because a 1907 Ohio case had
recognized mineral rights as separate and distinct property interests under state
law,145 the agency’s “unsuitable for mining” order had unconstitutionally taken the
company’s mineral rights.146 That is the extent of the court’s analysis.147 Whatever
else these cases might imply, they offer support for Professor Gardner’s skeptical
view of judicial federalism: “State courts often seem downright reluctant to construe
their state constitutions at all, and when they do so their opinions are often vague,
perfunctory, or almost entirely dependent on analytic strategies and terminology
borrowed from federal constitutional discourse.”148
IV. CONCLUSION
Race was a central issue in Ohio from the very beginning. The original state
constitution of 1802 and the successor constitution of 1851 explicitly limited
suffrage to whites even as both documents forbade slavery. Moreover, the
legislature imposed various legal disabilities and restrictions on African Americans.
For much of the Nineteenth Century, however, the Ohio Supreme Court tried to
narrow the scope of those restrictions by developing a distinctive jurisprudence that
was in some respects more progressive, and in general less obnoxious, than that
developed in other states and by the U.S. Supreme Court. Before the end of the
century, though, the court gave up the quest for a distinctive approach to equality.
The court’s diffidence in this area reflected a larger reluctance to develop an
independent jurisprudence of individual liberty under the state constitution. At the
same time, the court never directly challenged the racist assumptions built into the
state constitution. For this reason, we should not delude ourselves into believing that
the Ohio Supreme Court could have lit the way toward a more racially enlightened
society. Still, the failure to make better use of the state bill of rights was a lost
opportunity. It remains to be seen whether the modern court can do better than its
predecessors.
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Id. at 3-4, 780 N.E.2d at 1002.

143

Id. at 10, 780 N.E.2d at 1007-08.

144
Id. at 11, 780 N.E.2d at 1008 (citing Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 67 Ohio St. 3d 35,
616 N.E.2d 163 (syllabus ¶ 1) (1993)).
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Id. at 11, 780 N.E.2d at 1008 (citing Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co., 75 Ohio St. 493,
80 N.E. 6 (1907)).
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Id. at 12, 780 N.E.2d at 1009.
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The rest of the opinion was devoted to determining the “relevant parcel,” an important
aspect of any takings case, id. at 12, 780 N.E.2d at 1009, rejecting the argument that the
company’s activities did not constitute a nuisance (which would have defeated the taking
claim), id. at 13, 780 N.E.2d at 1009-10, and concluding that the company was entitled to
attorney’s fees and costs because the state’s position was not substantially justified, id. at 1415, 780 N.E.2d at 1010-11.
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Gardner, supra note 133, at 805.
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